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We investigate the differences in banks’ responses to monetary policy shocks across 
bank size, liquidity, and type, i.e., conventional versus Islamic, in Pakistan between 
2002:II to 2010:I. We find that following a monetary contraction, small banks with 
liquid balance sheets cut their lending less than other small banks. In contrast large 
banks maintain their lending irrespective of their liquidity positions. Islamic banks, 
though similar in size to small banks, respond to monetary policy shocks as large banks. 
Hence ceteris paribus the credit channel of monetary policy may weaken when Islamic 





Keywords: Monetary policy, Islamic Banking, Pakistan. 
 
JEL Classification: E5, G2. 
 1.  Introduction 
Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing segments of the global financial sector. 
It is currently and expanding at a rate of approximately 20% per year. In some countries 
the share of the Islamic financial sector has now reached a size and a level of 
development such that the financial arrangements it offers are a full-fledged alternative 
to those in the conventional financial sector. The countries where this has happened 
includes Malaysia, Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Countries, i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Some Asian countries like 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia are also experiencing a phenomenal increase in 
Islamic finance. Moreover, a number of western countries are now facilitating Islamic 
banking. And to tap this growing market, large conventional banks that have fairly 
recently opened an Islamic window includes Barclays, BNP Paribus, Citi Group, 
Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered and the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
The total volume of Islamic finance was estimated to roughly equal $1 trillion in 
2010 (Standard & Poor’s 2010). Commercial banking comprised the largest share, i.e., 
74 percent (International Financial Services London 2010). Investment banking 
accounted for 10 percent. The remaining part consists of Sukuk (Islamic bonds) and 
Takaful (Islamic Insurance). Assets of the largest 500 Islamic banks increased by 29 
percent to $822 billion in 2009, around the same time when the rest of the world’s 
financial system contracted, and many of the financial institutions were deleveraging 
their positions. The reason for this starkly different development resides in the fact that 
Islamic banking tenets do not allow the banks to charge interest and to be involved in 
the sales of debt instruments. Therefore, Islamic banks did not invest in the kind of 
instruments that were badly affected during the financial crises, namely derivatives, 
conventional securities and toxic assets. Banning short selling of shares after the crisis 2 
 
is a further reflection of Islamic finance as it stops dealers selling the assets which they 
do not own. A key question this brisk growth poses to academics and policymakers 
alike is whether the transmission of monetary policy through the so-called bank lending 
channel will be altered in strength when the Islamic segment of the banking sector 
becomes even more  important.
1
Islamic banks may be, on the one hand, unable or unwilling to “buy” wholesale time 
deposits at a fixed rate and may not consider their Islamic loans substitutable for any of 
the securities they would hold in their portfolio. This may make the transmission of 
monetary policy shocks through the Islamic segment of the banking sector more potent. 
On the other hand, Islamic banks singularly attract deposits and lend under interest free 
arrangements, likely entered for religious reasons by depositors and borrowers (Khan 
and Khanna (2010);  Baele, Farooq and Ongena (2010)).  These contractual and 
motivational features on both their liability and asset sides may allow Islamic banks to 
shield themselves from monetary policy shocks. Consequently, whether Islamic banks 
transmit monetary policy differently than conventional banks is an empirical question 
we aim to address in this paper. 
  Indeed, the potency of the bank lending channel 
crucially depends on the ability of the central bank to affect bank loan supply, i.e., 
whether banks cannot attract (time) deposits perfectly elastically or do not consider the 
loans granted and securities held in portfolio as perfect substitutes. 
                                                 
1 This bank balance sheet channel may be operational because of agency problems between banks and 
their providers of funds depositors, other debt-holders and equity holders (Bernanke (2007)). Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010) formalize this channel modeling financial intermediation as in Gertler and Karadi (2010) 
but include liquidity risk as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). The agency problems between banks and their 
borrowers (firms and households)  give  similarly  rise to the firm balance-sheet channel (Lang and 
Nakamura (1995);  Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996);  Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)). 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) for example find that, following the dates 
of monetary contractions identified in Romer and Romer (1989)), the ratio of bank loans to small versus 
large manufacturing firms falls. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)  show that, even after controlling for 
differences in sales between these firms, the differences in the behavior of small and large firm debt 
remain. If for firms bank loans are imperfectly substitutable with public financing, and prices adjust 
imperfectly, monetary policy affects real activity through the so-called credit channel. 3 
 
Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), who find that a monetary contraction is 
followed by a significant decline in aggregate bank lending, Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
analyze if there are important cross-sectional differences in the way that banks respond 
to monetary policy shocks. In this way controlling for loan demand,  they find that 
following  a monetary contraction, small banks with liquid balance sheets cut their 
lending less than other small banks. Brissimis, Kamberoglou and Simigiannis (2003), de 
Haan (2003), Kaufmann (2003), Loupias, Savignac and Sevestre (2003), Worms (2003), 
and Gambacorta (2005), for example, also find that liquidity positions of banks play a 
significant role for the way banks respond to a monetary shock in various European 
countries. Kishan and Opiela (2000), Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Ashcraft (2006) and 
Black, Hancock and Passmore (2009) similarly examine the differentiation across bank 
capitalization, core deposits, bank holding company status and bank business strategies, 
for instance. 
We follow the seminal paper by Kashyap and Stein (2000)  by investigating the 
cross-sectional differences in the way that banks respond to monetary policy shocks not 
only across bank size and liquidity, but also across bank type, i.e., conventional versus 
Islamic, in Pakistan between 2002:II to 2010:I. The country and sample period provide 
a unique setting to analyze this differential response. Pakistan may be one of the few 
countries in the world where both well-developed conventional and Islamic banking 
sectors have co-existed for a considerable period, formally since 2002 when Islamic 
Banking was re-introduced in Pakistan. Out of 40 banks that grant business loans, six 
are Islamic. 
As in Kashyap and Stein (2000) we find that following a monetary contraction, small 
banks with liquid balance sheets cut their lending less than other small banks, and that 
large banks maintain their lending irrespective of their liquidity positions. 4 
 
Islamic banks, and this is the main contribution of our paper, though similar in size 
to small banks, respond to monetary policy shocks much like large banks. Hence, 
ceteris paribus, the expected growth in the Islamic segment of the banking sector in 
many countries may lead to a weakening in the potency of the credit channel of 
monetary policy there. 
Khwaja and Mian (2008) also analyze lending by banks in Pakistan. They examine 
the drop in lending by different banks to similar firms following shocks to banks’ 
liquidity induced by unanticipated nuclear tests that took place in 1998 in Pakistan. 
They find that banks pass their liquidity shortages to firms, but firms with strong 
business or political ties can turn to alternative sources in the credit market. In contrast, 
we focus on the monetary policy shocks responding to foreign capital inflows that 
followed this period and assess the differential transmission through the conventional 
and Islamic segments of the banking sector. Other studies that focus on the banking 
sector in Pakistan include Khwaja and Mian (2005), Mian (2006), and Zia (2008), for 
example. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
institutional framework in Pakistan after 2001. Section 3 describes the data and 
introduces the econometric specification and Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2.  Pakistan After 2001 
a.  Monetary Conditions 
Following 9/11 there was a substantial inflow of capital in Pakistan.  Workers’ 
remittances especially those  from  the US, UK, Saudi Arabia and UAE  increased 5 
 
tremendously. Spurred by the privatization of major public sector corporations by the 
Government of Pakistan foreign direct investment (FDI) also boomed. 
The  growing inflow of remittances and FDI  caused  an  appreciation in the  local 
currency, the  Pakistan rupee  (PKR),  against  most  other currencies. Prior to 2001, 
Pakistan had faced severe shortages in foreign reserves because of the nuclear tests in 
1998 (Khwaja and Mian (2008)). The inflow of foreign capital was initially therefore 
welcomed. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the nation’s central bank, reacted to the 
inflow of foreign funds by purchasing US dollars and by increasingly accumulating 
these and other foreign reserves. Its aim was clearly also to curb the appreciation of the 
rupee  against  most  other currencies to safeguard  the  competitiveness  of Pakistanis 
exports. The purchase of dollars by the central bank almost inevitably caused the money 
supply to expand, despite attempts to sterilize the increase in money supply through the 
open market sales of government securities. 
As a result, the financial markets in Pakistan became saturated with excess liquidity 
and in August 2003 the interest rate on government securities for example dropped to as 
low as 1.27 percent. It is only after 2005 that monetary policy started to tighten in 
response to inflation, inexorably following the relentless monetary expansion during the 
preceding years. 
Since monetary policy during most of the analyzed time-period simply responded to 
this unique and large external shock, i.e., the concurrent inflow of remittances and FDI, 
our analysis will rely on the changes in the three-month Treasury bill rate as a most 
straightforward indicator of monetary policy. The use of variations in the short-term 
interest rate as a measure that proxies the change in the stance of monetary policy is 6 
 
fully in line with the literature analyzing the credit channel at the micro level.
2
b.  Islamic Banks 
 The use 
of a three-month interest rate follows many articles in Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon 
(2003) for example that analyze European data. Replacing the changes in the three-
month interest rate with the changes in the overnight interbank interest rate or with the 
changes in the six-month  Treasury bill rate yields very similar results, maybe  not 
surprisingly as the correlation between all interest series is very high.  
Preferably, Islamic banking is equity-, rather than fixed-interest-, based with profit 
and loss sharing on both the liability and asset side of a bank’s balance sheet. 
Depositors in Islamic banks are for all practical purposes shareholders that receive no 
guarantee with respect to the face value of their “deposits”. In principle, they fully share 
in the profits and losses of the bank in which they have their deposits. Similarly, on 
their asset side Islamic banks deploy an array of deferred sales and profit and loss 
sharing arrangements to finance household consumption or firm investment. In many 
respects, Islamic banks are not unlike conventional mutual fund banks (e.g., Cowen and 
Kroszner (1990)). 
Islamic banks seek funding through transaction deposits and investment accounts. 
Transaction deposits are similar to conventional banks’ demand deposits, i.e., cash can 
be withdrawn at any time by writing a check or by accessing an automatic teller 
machine (ATM), and the bank guarantees the nominal value of the deposit. However, 
Islamic banks cannot lend the funds to projects that are Haram, i.e., not permissible 
under Islamic Jurisprudence and related to alcohol, pork, sex, etc., or that deal with 
                                                 
2 See Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), Ashcraft 
(2006) and Black, Hancock and Passmore (2009) among others. On the other hand, Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) use vector auto regressions to identify monetary 
policy shocks. However Kashyap and Stein (2000) find very similar results using either the variation in 
the federal funds rate, the Boschen and Mills (1995) index or the Bernanke and Mihov (1998) measure. 7 
 
interest payments (Riba), gambling (Maysar), or excessive uncertainty (Garrar). In 
general, Islamic banks aspire to be more conservative in lending. 
Investment accounts  are the equivalent of the conventional savings accounts. 
However, these accounts do not offer a fixed interest rate, but rather involve profit and 
loss sharing between bank and depositors. Although consequently the face value of the 
investment deposits is not ensured, Islamic banks invariably observe due diligence in 
financing various projects. 
Joint venture financing arrangements constitute the most principled form of 
financing households and firms. However, in the early stages of their development, 
Islamic banks often adopt asset-backed fixed return arrangements, mainly deferred 
payment sales (Murabaha) and operational leases (Ijara), to finance household 
consumption, car purchases and real estate. In Pakistan these two types cover 
approximately 80 percent of the total financing provide by Islamic banks (as of 
December 2004), which has decreased to about 60 percent over time (as of December 
2009).
3
c.  Monetary Conditions and Islamic Banks 
 
The first Islamic bank in Pakistan was established in 2002 as a response to the  ─ 
until then  ─ unmet market demand for Islamic financial products (Source:  Financial 
Sector Assessment, SBP, 2004). Islamic banking quickly observed a sharp growth, as 
new and established banks entered the market by designing and offering suitable 
contracts to collect deposits from and extend credit to households and enterprises. 
The main problem immediately faced by the Islamic banks was the absence of a 
government security designed in accordance with Islamic principles, for use as a safe 
                                                 
3  These two products are mainly replaced by another fixed-return scheme called diminishing 
Musharikah (i.e., “diminishing partnership”), in which the partner in an asset (a house for example) not 
only pays rental payments to the bank but over time also buys the share owned by the bank. 8 
 
investment or to fulfill the liquidity requirements set by the SBP. In the absence of such 
an Islamic government security, Islamic banks had no immediate base rate to price their 
Murabaha  and  Ijara  contracts. Instead, they use the Karachi Interbank Offer Rate 
(KIBOR) (Source: Handbook of Islamic Products, SBP, 2009). However, the KIBOR is 
largely determined by the rate on short-term government securities such as the three-
month Treasury bill, which is set in fortnightly auctions. Because fixed return modes 
cover a large part of the total financing that is provided by Islamic banks, for the 
estimation of the strength of a lending channel the three-month Treasury bill rate can 
also be used as an indicator of the monetary policy stance. 
The balance sheet data in Table 1 provide a first glimpse of the crucial differences 
between large and small conventional banks and Islamic banks in terms of liquidity for 
example. A large bank is defined as a bank with more than two hundred billion PKR 
(around 2.5 billion US dollar) in assets. According to this definition there are six large 
banks, representing around sixty percent of all banking assets. We label the remaining 
banks as small banks. By assets, all Islamic banks are small banks.  
Liquidity is defined as the sum of cash, balances with Treasury banks and balances 
with other banks (as in Loupias, Savignac and Sevestre (2003) for example). Although 
the cash reserve requirement for both conventional and Islamic banks remained same 
through the entire sample period, liquidity varies noticeably across bank type. Small 
conventional banks are on average more liquid than large conventional banks during the 
period of easy monetary policy in 2003. However, the situation is reversed during the 
period of tight monetary policy after 2005. Hence,  contractionary  monetary policy 
creates more liquidity problems for small banks than for large banks. This is due to the 
fact that the large banks have relatively more options for nonreversible financing like 
debt or equity instruments. 9 
 
In comparison with conventional banks Islamic banks have the higher fraction of 
their assets in cash and balances with Treasury and other banks. This is also the case in 
many other countries where Islamic banks are present (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Merrouche (2010)). The explanation may be straightforward: In the early stages of their 
existence, Islamic banks had fewer immediate investment opportunities in comparison 
with their conventional counterparts. 
Most of their liquidity remained in the form of cash and balances with other financial 
institutions. This is mainly due to the absence of a Shariah compliant instrument called 
Sukuk (Islamic bond), Islamic banks initially did not have any alternative investment 
option in securities. This is evident from the low fraction of their assets in investments 
in 2003 (Table 1). The first compliant instrument was issued by a public sector 
enterprise only in 2005 but it could not fulfill the large investment appetite of Islamic 
banks. So until 2008, and in the absence of any Islamic government security, Islamic 
banks held cash to fulfill the statutory liquidity and cash reserve requirements (SLR). 
Holding only cash resulted in higher opportunity costs for Islamic banks than for 
conventional banks. Realizing that Islamic banks were at a cost disadvantage compared 
to conventional banks in meeting the SLR, the SBP relaxed it for Islamic banks. While 
their cash reserve requirements are the same, Islamic banks, on average, have been 
required to hold ten percent less in SLR than the conventional banks. Currently Islamic 
banks need to hold nine percent of the total demand and time deposits for SLR purpose, 
whereas conventional banks are liable to maintain nineteen percent of demand and time 
deposits (Table 2). Therefore, and in order to make our analysis comparable across bank 
type, we take the liquidity variable equal to the first two liquidity items, i.e., cash and 
balances with Treasury and other banks,  for which the  requirements  and  the 
opportunities are likely most similar for conventional and Islamic banks. 10 
 
In the absence of a risk-free Islamic instrument, Islamic banks also benchmarked 
their fixed-return contracts,  Murabaha  and  Ijara, to the  conventional interest rate 
charged  in  the interbank market, which is usually based on the Treasury-bill rate. 
However, the loan supply of Islamic banks is less likely to react to changes in monetary 
policy because as said they have fewer investment opportunities and are more likely to 
sit on a lot of spare liquidity. In addition, since Islamic banks assets are only indirectly 
linked to the policy rate, Islamic banks are less affected by the changes in monetary 
policy. 
d.  Bank Lending Channel in Pakistan 
The structure of a country’s banking system is likely to determine the strength of the 
response of bank lending to monetary policy shocks. The size of the banking sector and 
its market concentration, the fraction of banking assets that are liquid, and the banks’ 
capitalization could be crucial in establishing the potency of the bank lending channel. 
State and foreign ownership of domestically operating banks will also be important 
in determining the impact of domestic monetary policy on bank loan supply. State 
owned banks, that are mostly publicly guaranteed, likely attract new funds elastically to 
offset the impact of monetary contractions for example (Ehrmann, et al. (2003)). 
Similarly, foreign banks with close links to their parent institutions and global bank 
networks are likely to absorb the impact of domestic monetary policy without altering 
their domestic loan supply (foreign banks with most of their funding in their home 
country may contract lending relatively more following contractionary monetary policy 
in their home country). 
This section presents salient features of the banking system in Pakistan, such as the 
importance of banks within the financial system and corporate finance, the market 
structure, the heterogeneity of the banks, their overall performance and the role of the 11 
 
state in the banking system. Each of these features may determine the potency of the 
bank lending channel. Tables 3 and 4 provide many of the statistics we now discuss, 
while Table 5 summarizes how the various characteristics we will discuss determine the 
potency of the bank lending channel in Pakistan. 
i.  Importance of Banks within the Financial System  
Banks play a central and still expanding role in the financial system of Pakistan. In 
the wake of reforms, that started during 1990s and which included bank privatizations 
and interest rate liberalization for example, the total assets of the banking system 
increased during the last decade, both in absolute value and as a share of the total assets 
of the financial system, from 65 percent in 2002 to 74 percent in 2009.
4
In contrast, the share of nonbank financial institutions and the Central Directorate of 
National Savings decreased from 6.2 to 5.6 and from 25 to 17 percent, respectively. The 
latter category of financial institutions comprises various national saving schemes 
through which the government mobilizes household savings by offering various debt 
instruments at varying maturities and constitutes a major source of nonbank borrowing 
for the government. The minute share of microfinance and insurance institutions 
increased slightly. 
 
In general, global macroeconomic and political developments remain favorable to 
the Pakistani banking sector. Yet, total private sector credit granted by banks over gross 
domestic product (GDP) expanded briskly until 2005, but then leveled off, and for the 
first time dropped in 2007, corresponding to the tightening of monetary conditions and 
suggestive of the existence of a lending channel in Pakistan. 
                                                 
4 The banks also own shares in nonbank financial institutions, insurance companies, brokerage houses, 
and financial advisory services further underlining their central role in the financial system (Source: 
Financial Stability Review 2007-08, SBP). 12 
 
ii.  Importance of Banks for the Financing of Corporations 
Banks around the world are very important in fulfilling the financing needs of the 
corporate sector. Public debt and equity play, for most firms and even in financially 
well developed countries, only a minor role in financing corporate activities. 
Debt and equity markets are often found to be less developed and subject to more 
intense market imperfections in emerging economies. This is also the case in Pakistan. 
The issuance of public debt is very limited, and especially small firms rely heavily on 
bank debt. Bond market capitalization has even decreased over time in nominal terms. 
Stock markets continue to play a modest role in corporate sector funding. Stock market 
capitalization has shown an upward trend, but still the market is relatively thin, 
dominated by a handful of commercial banks’ stocks, and mainly driven by the demand 
from foreign investors. 
In sum, banks play a dominant role as financial intermediaries in Pakistan. If the 
supply of bank loans to firms changes following changes in monetary policy, firms 
likely will be affected as for most firms financing alternatives may  not be readily 
available.  
iii.  Performance of the Banking Sector 
The transmission of monetary policy will also depend on the performance of the 
banks. Stronger banking sector results in a weaker effect of monetary policy on the loan 
supply (Cecchetti (1999)). The financial strength of the banking system can be 
measured through asset quality, capital adequacy, liquidity and the earnings of the 
banking system. 
The first half of the sample period is characterized by an increase in the stability and 
expansion regarding banking system. Banking business remained profitable and return 13 
 
on equity (ROE) for example grew until 2006. Similarly, the cost –  income ratio 
dropped until the same year. 
However, after the tightening of monetary policy started in 2005, performance of the 
banking sector weakened and in subsequent years there was a rise in non-performing 
loans and a resultant erosion of capital. The banking sector in Pakistan is clearly not 
immune to contractionary monetary policy shocks, as bank balance sheets are affected 
by the increasing interest rates. 
iv.  Relationship Lending 
A strong relationship with a bank may insulate an individual firm to some extent 
from the cut in bank lending that follows a contractionary monetary policy.  This 
shielding may not only be vis-á-vis other firms that have no relationship, but also across 
time if banks would intertemporally “subsidize.” 
If firms engage multiple banks, firms can switch if one bank is affected more by 
contractionary monetary policy than the others (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000)). 
Large firms are mostly immune from any type of financing shortage by switching 
among banks when needed (Khwaja and Mian (2008)). Small firms however are often 
unable to substitute between banks, or between bank and other type financing. 
v.  Market Concentration and Size Structure 
Informational frictions in the banking sector are important for the lending channel to 
operate. If market players in the interbank markets are facing significant informational 
asymmetries, then distributional effects are likely to occur between banks that are 
confronted with informational issues to various degrees. Size criterion is used as 
standard in literature as a proxy to measure the informational opaque situation of banks. 
Small banks, in general, are considered to be more exposed to informational frictions 14 
 
than large banks. Therefore, the external finance premium for the former category is 
probably higher than for the latter group. 
The banking market is characterized by a steadily decreasing concentration during 
the sample period. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (i.e., the sum of market shares 
squared) decreased from 973 in 2002 to 736 in 2008, while the C-5 (the market share of 
the five largest banks by total assets) dropped from 61 to 52 percent. The group of the 
largest banks (with total assets more than 200 billion PKR) slipped from 65 percent in 
2004 to 52 percent in 2008. As concentration dropped, competition may have 
intensified, possibly making the bank lending channel more potent. 
vi.  State Influence in the Banking Sector 
Before the financial reforms in 1990s, the Pakistani financial system was mainly 
characterized by high government borrowing, bank-level credit ceilings, directly 
controlled interest rates, and directed and subsidized loan supply. 
Public ownership of banks was introduced in the 1970s and lasted until the early 
1990s, making the state all dominant in the banking sector. In 1990 there was not a 
single domestic private bank 
However, due to additional privatization of state-owned banks during the sample 
period studied, the influence of the state has been waning. The fraction of assets of 
state-owned banks over total assets of the banking system halved from 52 percent in 
2002 to 26 percent in 2009 potentially strengthening the banking lending channel of 
monetary policy transmission. 
vii.  Deposit Insurance 
There is no deposit insurance in Pakistan. Rather, deposits are in principle indirectly 
insured only by the continuous supervision by the regulatory authority. Detailed 
prudential regulations have been issued to avoid different types of risks a bank could be 15 
 
exposed to. Moreover, stringent liquidity requirements are in place to restrain banks to 
take excess leverage. 
Therefore, in absence of explicit deposit insurance the lending channel may be more 
potent, because the lack of certainty about the  nominal value of deposits makes 
depositors feel unsafe about their money. Consequently, following a tightening of 
monetary policy, deposits may be withdrawn and banks compelled to cut lending. 
viii.  Bank Failures 
There were few bank failures in Pakistan during the 1990s. Some institutions became 
involved in scandals and failed due to imprudent banking. The Mehran Bank scandal is 
well-known, for example. Some banks were involved in a few scandals causing 
depositors to feel insecure. Furthermore, some cooperative societies also collected 
deposits from the people with a promise of higher returns than the ongoing market rates. 
These societies inevitably failed and caused a loss for their depositors. 
Due to these incidents in the past, there may be a higher occurrence of rumors and a 
abrupt contraction in deposits following a tighter monetary policy. Furthermore, fraud 
and forgeries independently affect deposits, which in turn affect lending of the banks. 
Data related to such cases indicate a significant increase in such cases during the last 
few years (Source: Financial Stability Review 2008-09, SBP). 
ix.  Foreign Banks and Bank Networks  
In case any liquidity problem arises, due to a decrease in demandable deposits, 
foreign banks and banks in networks can resort to their head office or holding company 
to cover the liquidity shortage. Under this scenario, the potency of the bank lending 
channel of domestic monetary policy transmission becomes weaker. The role of foreign 
banks has been limited in Pakistan, i.e., they account for only ten percent  of  total 
banking sector assets. There are some  implicit bank networks in Pakistan in that 16 
 
ownership of some banks is common. There is also foreign ownership in some large 
banks. However, evidence strongly suggests banks in Pakistan do pass shocks to their 
liquidity position to their borrowers (Khwaja and Mian (2008)). This evidence, 
combined with the weak role of foreign banks and bank networks, makes it more likely 
that tight monetary policy eventually leads to the loss of deposits by the banks and a 
contraction in lending. 
3.  Data and Econometric Specification  
The main source of data is the Quarterly Report of Conditions (QRCs) of all banks 
submitted to the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The data set covers the whole population 
of all banking institutions that is operational in the financial system and incorporates 
their QRCs’ figures. The time period is from 2002:II to 2010:I at a quarterly basis. 
There are 40 banks, of which six are Islamic Banks. 
We lose observations because: (1) Some banks start operating after 2002:II; (2) we 
employ up to four lags of quarterly growth rates; (3) some banks merge and following 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) we remove banks’ observations in any quarter in which they 
are involved in a merger; (4) we remove observations for which the loan growth rate is 
more than three standard deviations from its sample mean; (5) there are missing values 
in the dataset. We are left with 756 bank – year: quarter observations that can be used in 
the estimations. 
The methodology, in general, is based on an assessment of the differences in the 
response of individual banks to a monetary policy shock according to their liquidity 





ci = bank i specific fixed effect, 
∆log(Lit-j) = the quarterly change in the logarithm of the total amount of the loans 
granted to the private sector by bank i in year: quarter t-j, 
∆Rt-j = the quarterly change in the three-month Treasury bill rate in year: quarter t-j, 
Tt = time trend, 
Quarterkt = dummy for quarter k in year: quarter t, and 
Xit-1 = liquid assets (i.e., cash and balances with the banks) over total assets of bank i 
in year: quarter t. 
m is set to equal four, i.e., one calendar year. This corresponds to the number of lags 
used in other papers assessing the potency of the credit channel in other countries. 
The main hypothesis is that contractionary monetary policy affects the illiquid banks 
more than the liquid banks, as the latter can offset any decrease in deposits by reducing 
their liquid assets. Consequently, our main coefficient of interest is the sum of 
interaction terms of liquidity Xit-1 with the monetary policy measure ∆Rt-j, i.e., ∑φ . 
Equation (1) is first estimated for the entire banking sector to evaluate the potency of 
the aggregate bank lending channel. Large banks are possibly less influenced than small 
banks by monetary shocks because of their ability to raise time deposits, which  − 
irrespective of their internal liquidity positions  −  would  make  their  lending  less 
dependent on monetary policy shocks. Islamic banks may also be less affected. 
Therefore, we also estimate Equation (1) including dummies both for large banks and 
Islamic banks. Both dummies are interacted then with all coefficients, except the trend, 
quarter, and province shares. These shares replace the bank-specific effects and are 





it  kt  k  t 
m 
j 
j  t  j  j  it 
m 
j 
j  i  it  R  X  Quarter  T  R  L  c  L  ε  φ  η  ρ  µ  α  +     
 
 
   
 
 
∆  +  +  +  Θ  +  ∆  +  ∆  +  =  ∆  −  − 
=  = 
− 
= 
−  − 





0  1 
)  log(  )  log(  )  1  ( 18 
 
constructed by calculating for each bank the relative number of branches it has in each 
province. 
In robustness, and to further control for the business cycle and loan demand, we also 
include change in the industrial production index (IPI). Equation (2) 
equals:
 
To check for endogeneity between lag dependent variable and the error term we use 
a Hausman-Wu test with the 5
th to 8
th lag in level of the dependent variable as the set of 
instruments. The result shows that the lagged dependent variable in both equations (1) 
and (2) is not correlated with the error term. 
4.  Results 
a.  All Banks 
Table 7 presents the results of the baseline regression, i.e., Equation (1), estimated 
using the observations of all banks. The purpose is to assess the potency of the bank 
lending channel for the overall banking sector. The table shows the sum of the estimated 
coefficients. The coefficients for provinces, quarter dummies and time trend are not 
shown. All estimates are in percentage terms and robust to White’s adjusted standard 
errors. 
The estimated coefficients confirm that the bank lending channel is operational in 
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Treasury bill rate equal -5.83***.
5
To identify that this decrease in loan growth actually represents a contraction in the 
supply of credit and not a reduction in the demand for credit, we interact the measure 
for bank specific liquidity with the interest rate (as in Kashyap and Stein (2000)). The 
sum of the estimated coefficients on this interaction term equals 20.71*. Consequently, 
banks with a higher level of liquidity contract lending less following a monetary shock 
(we discuss the economic relevancy of similar estimates in the next table). 
  Hence, an increase  in the interest rate by one 
percentage point decreases loan growth by 5.83 percentage points. 
To check the robustness of these estimates we replace the three-month Treasury bill 
rate with the KIBOR in Model (2) and the six-month Treasury bill rate in Model (3). 
The sum of the estimated coefficients on the changes in the interest rates equal -3.69*** 
and  -5.12***, respectively, while the sum of the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction term with liquidity equal 20.71 and 15.42. Individual liquidity coefficients 
are insignificant for all specifications. 
To control better regional effects Model (4) replaces the bank fixed effects with bank 
province shares, i.e., for each bank the number of branches it has in each province 
divided by the total number of branches it has. To control better for business cycle and 
loan demand Model (5) includes the change in industrial production. Results are mostly 
unaffected. 
b.  Large and Islamic Banks 
We now assess the role played by large and small (conventional) banks, and Islamic 
banks in the bank lending channel. We interact dummies for Large and Islamic banks 
                                                 
5 As in the Tables we star (the sum of) the estimated coefficients according to their significance levels. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 20 
 
with all independent variables (except with for the trend, season and province shares). 
Table 8 exhibits the results for various specifications. 
The baseline Model (1) indicates especially the small banks make the bank lending 
channel operational, a finding also present in Kashyap and Stein (2000). An increase in 
the three-month Treasury bill rate of one percentage point decreases the loan growth of 
small banks by 7.17*** percentage points in a year. The sum of the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction terms of liquidity and interest rates equal 25.06***. 
To assess if the estimated coefficients also have economically relevant implications, 
we need to calculate the response in lending by similarly sized banks, but different 
liquidity positions, to a monetary policy shock. Using the liquidity distribution of small 
banks in 2010:I, we consider a bank at the 9
th decile as a ‘liquid’ bank and at the 1
st 
decile as an ‘illiquid’ bank. The liquidity ratios according to this criterion are 24 and 5 
percent, respectively. Under this scenario, a one percentage point increase in the interest 
rate reduces the lending by an illiquid bank 4.5 percentage points more than the lending 
by a liquid bank over one year time period. This is calculated through multiplying ∑φ 
by liquidity differential of the liquid and illiquid banks i.e. 25.06 × (0.24 – 0.05). 
The estimated results for the large banks are different. The sum of the estimated 
coefficients on the change in interest rate is positive, i.e., 7.06*, but only marginally 
significant. Hence, large banks are not sensitive to changes in monetary policy due to 
their ability to fund their lending from the market other than deposits. The sum of the 
interaction terms of liquidity and the interest rate is now negative, as in Kashyap and 
Stein (2000), but insignificant. Using the difference between small banks and large 
banks coefficient there is 11.6 percent gap in the level of lending across liquid and 
illiquid large versus small banks one year after a monetary shock. 21 
 
All in all, these findings are very similar to those in Kashyap and Stein (1995), i.e., 
tight monetary policy decreases the loan growth of small banks but may actually 
increase credit granted by large banks in the short run. Romer and Romer (1990), 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) also show 
that credit reacts sluggishly or initially even expands following a monetary tightening. 
In Pakistan this effect is also present due to the response of the large banks. 
Islamic banks are equivalent to small banks in terms of asset size and as Islamic 
banks use the conventional interest rate as a key benchmark, one can expect that the 
bank lending channel will also operate through Islamic banks. However, since Islamic 
banks were expanding during the sample period, their deposit growth may have been 
less affected by tight monetary policy. Also, share of their fixed deposits in total 
deposits is higher than conventional banks. Using panel data of bank deposits across all 
commercial banks in Pakistan, Khan (2010)  also found that Islamic banks enjoy 
substantially higher deposit growth rates than other banks including the crises period of 
2008. Moreover, the liquidity position of the Islamic bank makes them less susceptible 
to a change in the interest rate. 
The results indeed show that the loan growth of Islamic banks is not affected by 
changes in the interest rate. The sum of the estimated coefficients equals, 2.05, positive 
but not statistically significant. Similarly, the sum of the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction terms of bank liquidity and changes in the interest rate equal -31.83, negative 
and insignificant. In both cases Islamic banks are statistically different from small banks 
with an estimated difference that equals 9.22* for the changes in the interest rate and 
56.90*** for the interaction term, but similar to the large banks. 
As before, and to check the robustness of these estimates, we replace the three-month 
Treasury bill rate with the KIBOR in Model (2) and the six-month Treasury bill rate in 22 
 
Model (3), and introduce bank province shares and the change in industrial production 
in Models (4) and (5). Results are mostly unaffected and document that even though 
Islamic banks are small (in terms of asset size), their response in lending to a monetary 
policy shock is similar to that of the large banks in the sample. 
5.  Conclusion 
We investigate the differences in banks’ responses to monetary policy shocks across 
bank size, liquidity, and type, i.e., conventional versus Islamic, in Pakistan between 
2002:II to 2010:I. We find that following a monetary contraction, small banks with 
liquid balance sheets cut their lending less than other small banks. In contrast large 
banks maintain their lending irrespective of their liquidity positions. Islamic banks, 
though similar in size to small banks, respond to monetary policy shocks like large 
banks. Hence the credit channel of monetary policy may weaken when Islamic banking 
grows, with their current portfolio under conventional monetary policy, in relative 
importance. 
However, if there are (1) sukuk  issuance that can be used as a monetary policy 
indicator for Islamic banks, (2) more investment opportunities available for Islamic 
banks, (3) an efficient Islamic interbank market, and (4) a competitive Islamic banking 
industry then the credit channel through Islamic banks may start gaining in potency to 




Table 1: Balance Sheet Items for Conventional Banks and Islamic Banks 
Balance sheet items for conventional banks and Islamic banks as a percentage of assets 
and liabilities, and indicated items. 
   Conventional Banks    
Islamic 
Banks 
  Large Banks    Small Banks       
  2003  2009    2003  2009    2003  2009 
Assets                 
Cash and Balances With Treasury Banks  10  10    9  6    12  8 
Balances With Other Banks  4  3    4  2    12  7 
Lending To Financial Institutions  7  3    11  4    0  16 
Call Money  8  11    14  13    0  0 
Repurchase Agreements  86  84    75  66    0  2 
Other  6  6    11  21    0  98 
Investments - Net  36  25    22  31    7  16 
Market Treasury Bills   69  51    49  67    0  5 
Pakistan Investment Bonds  19  9    43  14    0  2 
Other  12  40    8  19    100  93 
Advances - Net  37  52    50  45    64  44 
Other Assets  6  8    5  12    4  9 
Liabilities                 
Borrowing From Financial Institutions  5  6    22  17    12  4 
Deposits and Other Accounts  84  78    66  64    69  80 
Time Deposits  18  28    23  38    42  42 
Saving Deposits  50  36    54  33    46  31 
Current Accounts  31  36    23  28    12  26 
Subordinated Loans  0  1    1  1    0  0 
Other Liabilities  5  4    6  7    4  5 
Equity  5  10     6  10     15  10 




Table 2: Statutory Cash and Liquidity Reserve Requirements 
Statutory cash and liquidity reserve requirements as a percentage of time and demand deposits. 
  Cash Requirements  Liquidity Requirements 
Dates  All Banks  Conventional 
Banks  Islamic Banks 
Until 2006  5  15  6 
Feb 15, 2006  5  15  8 
July 18, 2006  5  15  8 
July 18, 2006  7  18  8 
June 31, 2008  8  18  8 
May 22, 2008  9  19  9 
Oct 17, 2008  6  19  9 






Table 3: Financial Intermediation in Pakistan in 2002 - 2009 
   2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
As a Share of Total Assets of Financial Sector                 
Microfinance Institutions  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Nonbank Financial Institutions   6.2  6.6  7.0  7.6  7.8  8.0  7.6  5.3 
Insurance    3.8  3.8  3.8  3.9  4.1  4.6  4.4  4.4 
Central Directorate of National Savings  Institutions  24.9  25.0  21.7  18.0  16.1  14.6  14.8  16.6 
Banks    65.0  64.5  67.3  70.4  71.9  72.7  73.0  73.5 
As a Percent of Gross Domestic Product                 
Microfinance Institutions  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Nonbank Financial Institutions   4.6  4.9  5.2  5.6  5.7  5.9  5.0  3.4 
Insurance    2.8  2.9  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.4  2.9  2.8 
Central Directorate of National Savings  Institutions  18.2  18.8  16.1  13.3  11.7  10.8  9.8  10.8 
Banks    47.7  48.3  50.1  51.8  52.4  53.9  48.1  47.6 
All  73.3  75.0  74.4  73.7  72.9  74.1  66.0  64.7 
Private Sector Credit  18.0  19.9  22.6  26.3  27.8  28.5  27.6  22.8 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan.                 
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Table 4: Banking Structure in Pakistan in 2002 - 2009 
   2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Public Debt and Stock Market Financing                 
Domestic Debt Securities Issued by the Corporate Sector, in % of GDP   0.19  0.05  0.08  0.16  0.04  0.07  0.25  0.02 
Domestic Debt Securities Issued by the Corporate Sector, in % of Bank Loans to Corporate Sector    1.50  0.30  0.40  0.60  0.20  0.30  0.90  0.10 
Stock Market Capitalization, in % of GDP  14  20  30  42  36  49  14  20 
Bank Performance                 
ROE (Profit after Tax over Capital and Reserves), in %  21  35  31  37  36  23  11  13 
Cost Income Ratio, in %  67  59  63  72  71  68  70  72 
Measures of Banking Sector Concentration                 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  973  912  850  762  745  739  736  712 
Coefficient of Variation  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4 
Assets of Largest 5 Banks, in % of Total Bank Assets  61  59  56  54  52  52  52  51 
Assets of Large Banks (Assets > 200 bln. PKR), in % of Total Bank Assets  n/a  n/a  65  64  60  58  59  57 
State Ownership                 
Assets of the Public Sector Banks, in % of Total Bank Assets  52  49  27  26  26  27  25  26 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
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Table 5: Factors Determining the Potency of the Bank Lending Channel  
This table provides the factors that determine the potency of the bank lending channel 
and the direction of their impact. 
Factor    Strengthening  Weakening 
Importance of the banking sector       
     Importance of bank financing       
     Investors protection and capital  markets       
Bank dependence     
Structure of the banking system       
    Concentration and size       
    Financial strength       
    State influence       
    Foreign ownership and bank networks       
Regulatory requirements       
    Capital adequacy       
    Deposit insurance       
Bank failures       
  28 
 
Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides the definitions, means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum of all variables used in the estimations. All variables are 
expressed in percent. The number of bank – year: quarter observations equals 756. 
Variable Name  Definition  Bank Type  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Small Bank  =1 if the bank has average total assets below 200 bln. PKR and 
is a conventional bank, = 0 otherwise 
28 banks  0.70  0.46  0  1 
Large Bank  =1 if the bank has average total assets exceeding 200 bln. PKR 
and is a conventional bank, = 0 otherwise 
6 banks  0.15  0.36  0  1 
Islamic Bank  =1 if the bank is classified as an Islamic Bank, = 0 otherwise  6 banks  0.15  0.36  0  1 
  Change in the log of private sector loans 
All Banks  4.2  12.6  -57.7  140.8 
Small Banks  17.4  14.3  -23.6  55.3 
Large Banks  22.5  10.6  7.0  48.0 
Islamic Banks  4.0  13.8  -57.7  140.8 
 
Change in the log of private sector loans, sum of last four 
quarters 
All Banks  20.4  36.0  -95.7  280.6 
Small Banks  18.5  38.0  -95.7  280.6 
Large Banks  3.8  7.7  -10.7  31.1 
Islamic Banks  5.9  10.7  -12.4  63.0 
  Liquid assets to total assets 
All Banks  16.0  14.8  3.0  92.2 
Small Banks  16.1  16.7  3.0  92.0 
Large Banks  12.3  3.3  5.8  25.5 
Islamic Banks  22.5  10.6  7.0  48.0 
  Change in three month treasury bill rate    0.4  0.7  -0.7  2.5 
 
Change in three month treasury bill rate, sum of last four 
quarters    1.7  2.0  -4.4  5.5 
  Change in the industrial production index    1.4  10.1  -18.0  21.8 
 
Change in the industrial production index, sum of last four 
quarters    7.5  12.2  -19.5  25.1 29 
 
Table 7:  Loan Growth, All banks 
The dependent variable is ∆log(Lit) which is the quarterly change in the logarithm of the total amount of the loans granted to the private sector by 
bank i in year: quarter t. The independent variables are: ∆log(Lit-j) which is the quarterly change in the logarithm of the total amount of the loans 
granted to the private sector by bank i in year: quarter t-j, ∆Rt-j is the quarterly change in the three-month Treasury bill rate in year: quarter t-j, 
and Xit-1 is the liquid assets (i.e., cash and balances with the banks) over total assets of bank i in year: quarter t. The estimations use 756 bank – 
year: quarter observations. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
(Sum of) Estimated Coefficients  Baseline  R = KIBOR  R = Six-month 






0.34***  0.36***  0.33***  0.40***  0.34*** 
 
-5.83***  -3.69***  -5.12***  -5.95***  -5.04*** 
 
20.71*  15.01  15.42  19.22  19.20 
 
        0.19 
Quarter Dummies, Trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Bank Province Shares  No  No  No  Yes  No 
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Table 8: Loan Growth, Across Bank Type 
The dependent variable is ∆log(Lit) which is the quarterly change in the logarithm of the total amount of the loans granted to the private sector by 
bank i in year: quarter t. The independent variables are: ∆log(Lit-j) which is the quarterly change in the logarithm of the total amount of the loans 
granted to the private sector by bank i in year: quarter t-j, ∆Rt-j is the quarterly change in the three-month Treasury bill rate in year: quarter t-j, 
and Xit-1 is the liquid assets (i.e., cash and balances with the banks) over total assets of bank i in year: quarter t. The estimations use 756 bank – 
year: quarter observations. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
(Sum of) Estimated 
Coefficients  Bank Type  Baseline  R = KIBOR  R = Six-month 






Small  0.36***  0.39***  0.35***  0.43***  0.36*** 
Large  0.15  0.29**  0.17  0.15  -0.02 
Islamic  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.21***  -0.04 
Difference from Small Banks 
Large  -0.21  -0.10  -0.18  -0.28**  -0.38 
Islamic  -0.28*  -0.33**  -0.28*  -0.23  -0.40** 
 
 
Small  -7.17***  -4.26***  -6.36***  -7.12***  -7.16*** 
Large  7.06*  4.99  6.74**  4.43  9.12*** 
Islamic  2.05  3.85  0.46  -2.95  11.25* 
Difference from Small Banks 
Large  14.23***  9.25**  13.10***  11.60***  16.28*** 
Islamic  9.22*  8.12**  6.82*  4.17  18.41*** 
 
Small  25.06**  18.24*  19.52  22.88*  25.84** 
Large  -39.20  -28.83  -39.47*  -17.40  -47.55* 31 
 
Islamic  -31.83  -27.29*  -26.38  -19.90  -48.08** 
Difference from Small Banks 
Large  -64.26**  -47.08  -59.00**  -40.28*  -73.39*** 
Islamic  -56.90***  -45.54**  -45.91***  -42.78**  -73.91*** 
Quarter Dummies, Trend    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
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